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Abstract: In this article, we explore the issue of whether the financial conditions into which a 
firm  is  born  have  an  effect  on  its  survival  chances.  After  both  correction  of  the  omitted 
variables bias and introduction of time varying covariates, we show two distinctive effects of 
banking debt on the survival of new firms in function of the time horizon: an insignificant or 
negative  impact  of  banking  debt  in  the  short  term  (less  than  2  years)  and  a  persistently 
positive effect in the medium term (more than 2 years). Founding financial conditions have 
long-lasting effects upon survival. 
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1.  Introduction 
Despite the relative consensus on the expected role of banking debt in the external 
financing of new firms (see, for example, Berger and Udell, 1998), the link between this way 
of financing and the survival of new firms had some but far from unanimous support in prior 
empirical works. On the one hand, some studies stress a rather negative impact of banking 
debt on the lifespan of new firms. Huygheaert et al. (2000) show, on a sample of Belgian new 
firms set up in 1985, that failed new firms obtained more of their funds from financial debt in 
comparison with non-failed firms. On a sample of American new firms set up in 1982, 1987 
and 1992, Asterbro and Berhnard (2003) confirm this result only for banking debt and found a 
strictly reversed result for non banking debt. On the other hand, other articles find a rather 
positive link between the use of bank finance by new firms and their survival. Using an 
accelerated failure time model on a sample of British new firms, Sardakis et al. (2008) show 
that bank finance rather promotes firm survival. Lopez-Garcia and Puente (2006), on Spanish 
new firms, confirm this result only if the firm is not too indebted.  
The theoretical analysis of the link between the access of new firms to external finance 
and their likelihood to survive is less controversial. As soon as the hypothesis of perfect 
financial  market  is  rejected,  firms  with  better  access  to  external  finance  can  have  higher 
survival probabilities. Several arguments justify this expectation. A first explanation, directly 
coming from the theory of industrial economics, is based on the idea that a better access to 
finance may allow firms to start with a larger size. Externally financed new firms are thus 
more likely to be closer to the minimum efficient scale needed to operate efficiently in a 
market  and  they  are  more  diversified  than  smaller  new  firms  (Audrestch  and  Mahmood, 
1994).  Furthermore,  they  are  less  likely  to  be  vulnerable  than  smaller  competitors.  By 
granting loans, bank can indeed supply new firms with an option to be financed in the future. 
This option makes new firms stronger at the time of tightness as they can maintain a buffer 
stock  of  cash  (Zingales,  1998).  When  they  are  financed  by  banks,  new  firms  could 
consequently endure poor performance for  a longer time and be in  a tougher position to 
survive expected temporary difficulties. According to these arguments, it might be because 
the banks  provide finance that new firms  survive. A  second explanation  can be  given to 
justify the expected link between access to bank finance and survival of new firms. This 
explanation is based on the theory of banking applied to new firms. The expected positive link 
between bank finance and survival can be due to the screening process used by banks when 
they decide to grant a loan. Bankers indeed assess the likelihood of new firms to reimburse 
credits that is directly linked with their probability of survival (Blumberg and Letterie, 2008)). 
If bankers succeed in screening new firms that are more likely to survive, debt is only offered 
to those start-ups that survive longer. Finally, the probability of survival should depend on 
banking debt but the probability of exit conditions the access of new firms to bank finance as 
well.  
Few papers directly cope with this issue linked to unobserved heterogeneity. For the 
French case, Crepon and Duguet (2004) cope with endogeneity by using a score model. They 
evaluated  the  impact  of  bank  loans  and  start-up  subsidies  on  the  survival  of  new  firms 
between 1994 and 1997. They show that, for formerly unemployed people, bank loans alone 
have no significant effect on the survival of start-up companies while the best performance is 
achieved by projects financed both by loans and subsidies
§. Greffe and Simonnet (2008) focus 
                                                 
§ They insist on the effect of subsidies that is stronger than the effect of the bank loans surely because the former 
funding is attributed to a larger number of recipients.
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on a sample of French new firms (ex nihilo new firms and takeovers) set up in 1998 from the 
cultural sector. By using a multivariate probit, they show that, after instrumentation, banking 
loans influence no more the survival time of new firms.  
The purpose of this paper is to go on studying empirically the influence of banking 
debt on the survival of French new firms after the correction of the endogeneity linked to 
unobserved heterogeneity. In this paper we propose to generalize the results of Greffe and 
Simonnet (2008) to all sectors. We propose to refine their results as well by focusing on ex 
nihilo new firms. Takeovers and pure new ventures are indeed very different firms (Bastié, 
Cieply and Cussy, 2009; Parker and Van Praag, 2010; Block et al., 2010). In particular, the 
way  takeovers  are  financed  is  very  specific,  more  dependent  on  external  finance  though 
leveraged buyouts transactions. Finally, we propose to go further by studying the duration of 
the effect of bank finance on survival. In this paper, we do not only explore the issue of 
whether the conditions into which a firm is financed at birth have an effect on its survival 
chances but we study as well how long this effect lasts. Geroski et al. (2007) show that 
founding effects on survival persist without much of attenuation for several years after the 
founding  of  the  firms,  but,  in  this  article,  the  access  to  banking  debt  is  not  analysed. 
Audrestch et al. (2000) find that the impact of debt structure is only significant in the sixth 
year subsequent to entry and negative but the problem of endogeneity is not directly taken 
into account.  
Using a large sample of French  ex nihilo new firms created in 1998, our findings 
suggest that the use of banking loans by ex nihilo new firms at their founding influences 
significantly their likelihood to survive. We observe an effect of banking loans on the survival 
duration of new firms even after the correction of the endogenous bias and  this effect is 
persisting over time.   
The paper is  organized as  follows. Section 2  describes  the data and the empirical 
method. Section 3 introduces the variables. Section 4 discusses the results and compares them 
to those of previous studies and section 5 ends with a discussion of the implications of our 
results for policy-makers and suggestions for possible future research.  
2.  Methodology 
2.1.   Database and sample selection 
In this article, we have used data from the System of Information on New Enterprises 
(SINE) that has been produced by the French National Institute of Statistical and Economic 
Studies (INSEE) every four years since 1994. This system is based on a compulsory survey 
that analyzes the start-up and development conditions of enterprises and the problems they 
encounter over the first five years of their existence. In this article, we have used the cohort of 
new firms set up in 1998. The 1998 SINE survey scheme consists of selecting a set of new 
enterprises  representative  of  new  firms  created  in  1998.  This  cohort  is  designed  to  be 
representative  of  the  entire  population  according  to  three  criteria:  regional  localization, 
economic sector (9 areas) and mode of entry (ex nihilo creation or takeover). A frequency 
weight variable is used to make the sample fit the total population of new firms. The weight 
accorded to each observation in the sample corresponds to the number of enterprises that this 
observation represents. For this cohort of new firms, a second survey was carried out in 2001 
and a third one in 2003. These surveys give information about the status of these new firms 
(closed down or still running) respectively three years and five years after their birth.  
In  this  article,  we  focus  on  the  creation  of  ex  nihilo  independent  new  firms. 
Subsidiaries, and more generally groups of all kinds, and takeovers are excluded from the 4 
 
sample  because  access  to  finance  is  very  different  for  them.  They  benefit  from  specific 
resources that come from the group for subsidiaries
** or that are based on leverage buy out 
schemes  for  takeovers
††.  In  this  study,  we   finally  focus  on  ex  nihilo  creations  which 
correspond to new means of production.  
As  we  study  the  relationship  between  finance  and  survival,  we  have  dropped 
individuals who do not declare to use a mode of financing whatever this mode can be. This 
situation  concerns  17%  of  the  ex  nihilo  independent  new  firms.  Among  entrepreneurs 
excluded, some ones do not need any mode of financing to start because their projects needs 
low  level  of  capital  to  start.  The  deletion  of  these  entrepreneurs  artificially  increases  the 
proportion of projects financed by bank loans; nevertheless we cannot distinguish them from 
true non responses. To ensure the robustness of results, the estimations are also performed by 
including non responses in the sample (see part 4.2). Finally, we observe the survival time of 
17 336 pure new ventures that have declared to use mode(s) of financing at birth. 
2.2.  Econometric method 
Dealing with the role of bank loans on the survival of firms, we must cope with an 
omitted variable bias. As bankers screen applicants for credit, the use of banking loans by new 
firms and their survival may have common determinants. We think in particular to the human 
capital of entrepreneurs and to the economic characteristics of projects that conditions both 
the access of new firms to banking debt and their survival. Without any doubt, some of these 
determinants are unobservable factors (Crépon and Duguet 2004, Greffe and Simonnet 2008). 
Consequently the impact of bank loan upon survival can be overestimated. To solve this 
problem,  this  variable  must  be  instrumented.  The  retained  instrumental  variable  is  the 
participation of entrepreneurs  to  voluntary training programs. This  specific preparation of 
entry can directly influence the likelihood of new firms to obtain banking loans for at least 
two reasons. First, in situation of asymmetric information between bankers and entrepreneurs, 
this  preparation  can  signal  the  credibility  of  project  to  outsiders.  Second,  nascent 
entrepreneurs generally prepare with training officers business plans that correspond strictly 
to the requirements of bankers. As a result, they can more easily access to banking debts. 
Nevertheless,  training  programs  do  not  directly  influence  the  survival  of  new  firms.  The 
effects of training programs as component of human capital are marginal in comparison with 
the expected influence of the formal education and the prior experiences of the entrepreneur. 
Moreover, in the context of training programs, the building of the business plan is not linked 
to intrinsic quality of founders and thus cannot directly affect the survival of new firms. 
 In order to investigate factors affecting  the survival of new business, we use two 
different models. First, the causal effect of bank loans on survival at n years (conditional or 
not to survival at n-1 years) is estimated. Unobserved and correlated determinants of bank 
loans and survival can lead to overstate or underestimate this causal effect in a probit model. 
To solve this problem, a bivariate probit model is estimated. In this model, the probability of 
bank loans and the probability of survival at n years are simultaneously estimated. Residuals 
                                                 
** Subsidiaries benefit from a kind of internal financial market (Cable, 1985).
 
††  Leveraged  buyouts  are  specific  financial  transactions  based  on  a  high  proportion  of  debts,  most  often 
unsecured,  including  bank  debt,  senior  subordinated,  junior  subordinated  and/or  mezzanine  tranches.  In  a 
leveraged buyout, a target is acquired by a specialized investment firm (the „newco‟) using a relatively small 
portion  of  equity  and  a  relatively  large  portion  of  outside  debt  financing.  More  specifically,  the  financial 
structure of buyouts typically consists of 60-80% of debt, as opposed to debt ratios of 20-30% in public firms 
(Rajan and Zingales, 1995).  5 
 
of these two estimations follow a normal bivariate law with variance of each term normalized 
to  1  and  covariance  equals  to .  To  ensure  complete  identification  of  the  model  and  an 
estimation of  , the instrumental variable (“the training program”) is only introduced into the 
equation of bank loans (Maddala, 1983). If this coefficient is not statistically significantly 
different  from  zero,  the  survival  at  n-years  and  the  use  of  bank  loans  are  statistically 
independent. The use of bank loans is an exogenous factor and we can identify unbiased 
determinant for the survival function, which is separately estimated. The selection bias linked 
to  the  estimation  of  the  conditional  survival  of  firms  is  neglected  as  we  cannot  find  an 
instrument that impacts the survival at n-1 years without influencing the survival at n years 
(for n=2 to 5). Nevertheless, as the objective is to analyze the evolution of this impact and to 
compare the results of different models, this problem is less thorny.  
Second, the life duration is analyzed. In the sample, the data are right censored. This 
situation is due to firms which were still alive at the time when the data were last updated. To 
overcome this problem we use a hazard rate approach that considers not only the potential 
mortality of firms but the length of survival time. This length is measured in number of 
months. Finally we model the conditional probability that a firm stops its activity over a 
specified period. In this article, two different specifications are used: the Weibull model and 
the semi parametric Cox model. In this article, we present the results of the Weibull model 
with Gamma heterogeneity. This specification was used by Greffe and Simonnet (2008) who 
worked with the same database but focused on the cultural sector whatever may be the entry 
mode  of  firms  (ex  nihilo  creation  and  takeovers).  This  choice  is  justified  by  first  the 
opportunity  to  compare  our  results  with  this  prior  research  and  secondly  the  quality  of 
estimates: based on the test performed on residuals from Cox Snell, the Weibull model fits 
well these data (see Appendix A). 
The statistical procedure is directly inspired by Heckman and Robb (1985). In a first 
step, a probit model is implemented to estimate access to bank loan. To control the endogenity 
we introduce the instrumental variable in a second stage which concerns the survival model. 
Omitted variables and measurement errors in observed survival times can lead to errors in the 
interpretation  of  the  effects  of  variables  upon  survival.  Consequently,  the  unobserved 
heterogeneity is considered. We introduce an unobservable multiplicative effect on the hazard 
function. The gamma distribution is chosen for the distribution of this frailty term. To analyze 
the impact over time of the use of bank loans, this last variable and the others are interacted 
with the age of firms
‡‡.  
3.  The predictors: definition and descriptive statistics 
In this article, we construct a reduced form model of the survival likelihood of new 
ventures. Predictors concern the financing of new firms, the human capital of entrepreneurs 
and the characteristics of firms
§§.  For each of them, descriptive statistics are reported in  the 
tables  1,  3  and  4.  These  tables  report  for  each  dummy  variable  the  percentage  of 
entrepreneurs/projects which satisfy the  positive modality. Three samples are successively 
introduced: bank financed firms, non bank financed firms and all firms.  Two tests are 
                                                 
‡‡ Disney et al. (2003) used this methodology to examine the survival of U.K. manufacturing establishments 
from 1986 to 1991. 
§§ All variables are dichotomous variables, except the entrepreneur‟s age. They all take the value one (and zero 
otherwise) for the modality that is presented in the text and in Table 1.  
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performed. The first is a Pearson’s chi squared test that looks for the independence between 
bank finance and other variables (test 1). The second is  a log rank test that assesses the 
equality of survivor function in regard with each variable.  In the following tables, we only 
report for each test the critical probability.  
3.1.  Financial variables: bank loans and other modes of financing  
In SINE 1998, firms are questioned about not only their use of banking debts but about 
their use of other financial tools as well. This last category gathers heterogeneous creditors: 
public agencies, local private institutions, and financial companies that grant consumer credits 
to  individuals.  This  heterogeneity  leads  us  to  consider  them  separately.  Five  sources  of 
funding are finally distinguished: bank loans, other loans, private equity, subsidies (and other 
public aids), and personal funds. All these financial means are not exclusive and firms can use 
at birth several of them. The table 1 shows the dominance of two ways of financing: self-
finance, that concerns quite 82% of new firms, and banking debt, that concerns quite 29% of 
new firms. These statistics show as well that bank loans are not independent on the others 
mode of financing (Test 1) and that survival is not independent on bank loans, personal funds 
and subsidies (Test 2).  
Table 1. Modes of financing (descriptive statistics) 
 












Bank Loans      28.53    <0.001 
Personal funds  57.53  91.05  81.49  <0.001  <0.001 
Subsidies  7.05  3.08  4.22  <0.001  0.018 
Private equity  2.47  2.07  2.19  0.014  0.101 
Others loans  14.26  11.59  12.35  <0.001  0.825 
In a first analysis, survivor functions are plotted in the same graph for two subsamples: 
bank financed firms and other firms. The Figure 1 illustrates the Kaplan-Meir product limit 
estimator survival function for these two subsamples. Firms that are not financed by bank 
loans  have  a  shorter  lifespan  than  the  others.  The  log  rank  test  for  equality  of  survivor 
functions confirms this result.  7 
 
 
This impact of bank loan on lifespan appears to be persistent over time. The Table 2 
presents the descriptive statistics on the links between survival at n years and the use of bank 
loans.  The  percentage  of  survivors  at  n  years  financed  by  bank  loans  at  their  start  is 
significantly higher than the percentage of failed firms at n years financed by bank loans. This 
significant difference remains when we consider the conditional survival (survival at n years 
given survival at n-1 years). In the same way, the percentage of firms financed by bank loans 
which survive at n years is significantly higher than the percentage of survivors not financed 
by bank loans. This result remains valid when we use conditional survival.  
Table 2. Univariate analysis 









































































































































































































































































































































One year survival  28.53  29.42  17.60  92.45  95.35  91.30 
Two years survival  28.53  30.74  19.22  80.82  87.08  78.32 
Three years survival  28.53  32.32  19.96  69.30  78.52  65.62 
Four  years survival  28.53  33.56  20.45  61.59  72.46  57.25 



















































Two  years survival/one  
years  29.42  30.74  20.27  87.42  91.33  85.79 
Three years survival/two 
years  30.74  32.32  21.19  85.75  90.18  83.78 
Four years survival/three 
years  32.32  33.56  22.43  88.87  92.28  87.25 
Five years survival/four 
years  33.56  34.40  25.15  90,96  93.22  89.82 
Finally, this univariate analysis stresses that  bank loans affect the survival of new 
firms and that the effect remains over time. These results show as well that effects are not 8 
 
perfectly linear in function of time and that the persistence of effect must be more deeply 
questioned.  
3.2. Human capital proxies  
Three kinds of human capital are distinguished: the general human capital, the specific 
human capital and the accumulated human capital. These variables and descriptive statistics 
are presented in the Table 3. 
The  general  human  capital  takes  into  account  the  personal  characteristics  of 
entrepreneurs. We introduce some demographic characteristics, in particular gender, age and 
race. We take into account their educational background by considering three different levels 
of  diploma  (technical  undergraduate,  A-level  and  postgraduate  diplomas).  The  founder‟s 
motivation can be expected to influence both the banker‟s decision and the survival of new 
firms (Reynolds et al., 2005). In the SINE database, we indentify “opportunity entrepreneurs”, 
who  start  a  business  in  order  to  pursue  an  opportunity,  entrepreneurs  with  a  “taste  for 
entrepreneurship”, who desire to become entrepreneurs, and the “necessity entrepreneurs”, 
who create their own employment because they cannot find any paid job on the formal labour 
market. The expectations of entrepreneurs concerning the future can be a proxy for over (or 
under) confidence and/or private information owned by the entrepreneurs on the probability 
of success. Two kinds of expectations are taken into account: cash flow expectations and 
growth expectations.  
The  specific  human  capital  refers  to  prior  experiences  of  entrepreneurs.  We  first 
consider the past professional experience of creators in the same activity of the new firms. We 
then precise the nature of this prior activity which can be either centred on production or on 
trade.  On French data, Crépon and Duguet (2004) underlined the influence of the previous 
statute  of  entrepreneurs  on  the  labour  market  (employed  or  unemployed).  Prior  paid 
experiences impact positively the access to bank loans and the lifespan of new firms. The 
situation  of  founders  before  starting  a  new  business  is  used  to  proxy  this  experience. 
Entrepreneurs  can  be  employed,  short  term  unemployed,  long  term  unemployed  or  non-
worker. Approximately half of the founders in the sample have a job just before the start of 
new firms. The founder can improve his (her) specific human capital when he(she) exerts an 
effort to prepare the project like writing a business plan and/or consulting an accountant. Such 
commitments can signal to banks that new entrepreneurs are well-prepared (Schutjens and 
Wever, 2000). To take into account this preparation of projects, four variables are introduced: 
the participation to voluntary training activities, carrying out market researches, carrying out 
prospective financial accounts and receiving advices from specialists
***. This experience in 
setting up a firm can increase the entrepreneur’s human capital value; this is why we consider 
the case of serial creators by introducing a variable equal to one when entrepreneurs answer 
that they already set up a firm.  
Finally,  Arribas  and  Vila  (2007)  introduced  the  concept  of  “accumulated  human 
capital”  when  firms  are  created  by  several  individuals.  Human  capital  can  indeed  be 
accumulated though a community of individuals. Woo et al. (1989) showed that these firms 
are more successful than those founded by a single entrepreneur. Arribas and Vila (2007) 
found that they survive longer. Blumberg and Letterie (2007) stressed that applicants who 
                                                 
*** We observe in Table 3 that the entrepreneurs who prepare the entry (measured by these four last variables) are 
more  often  financed  by  bank  loans  than  others.  The  survival  function  depends  on  these  factors  as  well. 
Nevertheless, the impact of training program upon the survival is smooth. According to us, this variable does not 
impact directly the survival of new firms; its influence passes though banking loans. This result confirms the 
choice of this variable as instrumental variable.  9 
 
intend to remain the single owner are more likely to face credit rationing.  To proxy this 
accumulated human capital we consider both family members and other associates. We also 
introduce the presence of entrepreneurs in the entrepreneurs’ family to take into account the 
influence of social capital. 
The Table 3 shows that banks loans are not independent on human capital proxies 
(except  proxies  concerning  prior  activities)  and  that  survival  is  not  independent  on  these 
variables as well (except training program and management with associates)  
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Gender (ref. man)  74.40  73.10  73.47  0.007  <0.001 
Entrepreneur‟s age (continue)  36.46  37.31  37.07  <0.001  <0.001 
Nationality (ref. native)  93.45  87.25  89.02  <0.001  <0.001 
Education             
 No diploma  15.43  18.10  17.34 
<0.001  <0.001  Technical undergraduate diploma  41.86  29.84  33.27 
Secondary school level  17.88  17.94  17.92 
Postgraduate diploma  24.83  34.12  31.47 
Personal goal , motivations            
Taste for entrepreneurship  63.20  53.35  56.16  <0.001  <0.001 
Catching opportunity  28.88  26.30  27.04  <0.001  <0.001 
Expectations            
Growth  55.77  52.76  53.62  <0.001  <0.001 
























 Situation  of  the  entrepreneur 
before creation  
         
Employed  51.47  46.45  47.88 
<0.001  <0.001  Short term unemployed  24.44  19.04  20.58 
Long term unemployment  14.35  18.29  17.17 
Non-worker  9.74  16.22  14.37 
Experience in the main  activity   58.80  54.94  56.04  <0.001  <0.001 
Prior activity experience           
Production  28.89  21.97  23.94  <0.001  <0.001 
Trade and marketing  32.25  32.77  32.62  0.310  <0.001 
Serial creator  20.94  23.95  23.09  <0.001  <0.001 
Preparation of entry            
Prospective financial accounts    74.39  48.47  55.86  <0.001  <0.001 
Market researches    44.93  33.10  36.48  <0.001  <0.001 
Professional advices  26.20  19.61  21.49  <0.001  <0.001 















  Entrepreneurial network   73.28  69.30  70.44  <0.001  <0.001 
Management of firm            
With members of family  23.55  16.50  18.51  <0.001  <0.001 
With other associates  11.08  12.82  12.32  <0.001  0.063 
 
3.3. The characteristics of project and firm  
Post-entry performance of new firms and their access to banking debt not only depend 
on  the  entrepreneurs‟  characteristics  but  on  the  quality  of  projects  too.  Environmental 
conditions and strategic choices at birth are determinant in the survival function of new firms 
(Geroski et al, 2007). The table 4 presents the descriptive statistics upon these variables.  
Environmental factors refer to the firm‟s sector that may involve specific conditions 
on  concentration  and  entry  rates.  Kaniovski  and  Peneder  (2008)  found,  on  a  sample  of 
Austrian firms, differences in hazard rates among different types of manufacturing industries 
distinguished according to the nature of their sunk costs, their reliance on human resources 
and inputs from external services. As sectors influence significantly new firm‟s survival, it is 
not  surprising  that  bankers  introduce  information  on  sector  affiliation  in  their  screening 
device.  Very  early,  Altman  (1968)  showed  indeed  that  corporate  bankruptcy  was  highly 11 
 
sector-dependent.  Consequently,  we  introduce  dummy  variables  to  take  into  account  the 
activity sector of the firm.  
Firms‟  strategies  correspond  to  the  choice  of  size  at  birth  and  the  introduction  of 
innovative activities.  The choice of entry size is a strategic variable as it allows either to 
reach the minimum efficiency scale or to stay small enough to escape predation from potential 
rivals. Empirical studies showed both the positive influence of size on the life duration of new 
firms (Dunne et al., 1989; Bates, 1990; Audretsch and Mahmood, 1994, 1995; Mata and 
Portugal, 2004) and the negative impact of size on financial constraints (Galéotti et al., 1994; 
Himmelberg and Petersen, 1994; Gilchrist and Himmelberg, 1995; Brito and Mello, 1995). To 
proxy the size of firm we introduce five levels of financial needs at start and the number of 
new jobs. More than a half of ex nihilo creations need less than 80 000 €. The number of jobs 
is a continuous variable. On average, an ex nihilo creation creates 1.75 jobs. The choice to 
develop innovative activities is a strategic variable too that influence positively firm growth 
(Hall,  1987;  Mansfield,  1962)  and  life  expectancy  (Hall,  1987;  Cefis  and  Marsili,  2004; 
Esteve-Pérez and Manez-Castillejo, 2008). Innovative activities might influence the access of 
new firms to banking debt as innovations exacerbate all the drawbacks new firms have to 
cope with when they look for external finance (Egeln et al., 1997; Westhead and Storey, 
1997; Freel, 2007). In particular, banks are unable to use innovative assets as collaterals when 
they  finance  innovative  firms  because  these  assets  are  by  definition  highly  specific 
(Williamson,  1988).  However,  the  existence  of  collateralized  assets  is  determinant  in  the 
decision of bankers to grant credit, in particular to new firms. Collaterals signal indeed the 
quality of firms and mitigate inefficiencies that arise when borrowers hold ex ante private 
information (Bester, 1987; Besanko and Thakor, 1987; Chan and Thakor, 1987). To take into 
account  innovative activities we can use in  the SINE database questions  on the potential 
introduction of new products or/and new methods of production (process) or/and the opening 
of new markets (marketing). Collateral can be based on the personal assets of the entrepreneur 
and/or assets owned by the firm. To take into account collaterals given by entrepreneurs to 
bankers, we consider the real estate of the entrepreneur, in particular the premises where the 
activity takes place. Blumberg and Letterie (2007) found indeed that credit denial is less likely 
to occur when the applicant owns a house.  
The  Table  4  shows  that  access  to  banks  loans  and  survival  are  not  independent  on  the 
characteristics of firms. 
Table 4. The characteristics of firms (descriptive statistics) 
    Bank loans 
(%) 
No bank 
loans  (%) 
All founders 
(%) 








Trade  29.30  28.43  28.68 
<0.001  <0.001 
Agribusiness  2.10  0.71  1.11 
Industry  8.85  7.17  7.65 
Building  18.70  16.88  17.40 
Transportation  5.38  3.68  4.17 
Real estate  2.52  3.30  3.08 
Enterprise services  12.09  25.69  21.81 
Private person services  15.83  9.87  11.57 



















  Number of jobs   1.85  1.67  1.72  <0.001  <0.001 
level of financial need        
<0.001  <0.001  Less than 1500€  3.52  21.42  16.32 
[1500€ , 3800€[  7.99  14.66  12.76 12 
 
[3800€ , 8000€[  12.01  11.15  11.39 
[8000€, 16000€[  27.92  38.26  35.31 
[16000€, 38000€[  24.71  9.88  14.11 
[38000€ , 76000€[  12.24  3.00  5.64 
>76000€  11.62  1.62  4.47 
Innovation 
Process  3.65  4.54  4.28  <0.001  0.003 
Product  12.94  13.62  13.43  0.065  <0.001 
Marketing  7.85  5.74  6.34  <0.001  <0.001 
Inter firm 
relationships 




8.95  6.80  7.41  <0.001  <0.001 
Collateral  Ownership of premises  26.74  22.62  23.79  <0.001  <0.001 
 
4.  Results 
4.1. The medium term effect of bank loans on the survival of new firms 
The results of the bivariate probit analysis and those of the duration model are given 
respectively in the Tables 5 and 6. The results concerning the use of banking debt are exposed 
in the Appendix B. As expected, banking debt depends on lots of determinants that influence 
the survival of new firms as well
†††. These results confirm the choice of the participation of 
entrepreneurs  to  training  program s  as  instrumental  variable.  This  variable  influences 
significantly and positively the use of banking debt whereas it does not exert any significant 
impact on the survival of new firms.  
To study the causal effect of banking debt on survival and its persistence over time, we 
estimate  the  joint  probability  of  obtaining  a  bank  loan  and  being  still  alive  at  n  years 
(conditional or not to the survival of new firms at n-1 years). In table 5 we only present, the 
results concerning the coefficient of bank loans in the equation of survival at n years for the 
probit model and the bivariate probit model. This analysis shows that the causal effect of bank 
loans on the survival of new firms is not constant over time. After instrumentation, the use of 
bank loans does no more positively affect the survival of new firms at birth. When we observe 
unconditional results, bank loan is not significant in the bivariate probit model during the first 
year of new firms and the causal effect of banking debt becomes negative during the second 
year.  We  observe  the  same  negative  coefficient  for  the  conditional  result  when  the  firm 
survives at least two years. The screening of banks can explain this result. Bankers indeed 
select firms with a rather high expected probability of survival. At the beginning of life, once 
the banking screening has been controlled, firms with identical characteristics (in terms of 
probability of success) do not have significantly different lifespan because of their use of 
banking  debt.  This  result  may  be  due  to  the  financial  burden  linked  with  debt  that  can 
compensate the positive effect of debt in terms of entry size.  
In the Table 5, an interesting result is the medium term effect of bank loans on survival. 
                                                 
††† We find rather classic results concerning the determinants of banking debt by new firms (Appendix 2). The 
use of banking debt is more frequent when entrepreneurs have technical undergraduate diploma,  when they 
decide to start up a new business to catch an opportunity or because they desire to enter into entrepreneurship, 
when they follow training programs and build prospective financial accounts, when the capital needed to start is 
rather high and when entrepreneurs own the buildings where new firms are established. The use of banking debt 
decreases as soon as new firms can use other funds, except subsidies, when entrepreneurs are not French, when 
new  firms  create  jobs,  when  entrepreneurs  declare  process  innovation  and  when  new  firms  develop  close 
relationships with other firms, through for example subcontracting. 13 
 
In the third survival year, the causal effect is significant and positive for all models (probit 
and bivariate probit) and all kinds of probability of survival (conditional and unconditional). 
This effect is particularly high for conditional likelihoods. The analysis of the confidence 
intervals show that the effect of bank loans  increases between two and three years after birth; 
at  a  level  of  90%,  few  values  of  the  confidence  intervals  are  common  for  unconditional 
survival  and  no  value  at  all    for  conditional.    Furthermore  the  coefficient  of  correlation 
between the residues affecting the use of banking loan and the survival of new firms is not 
statistically different from zero for unconditional probability of survival. The bank loan is 
consequently exogenous and coefficients obtained in the simple probit are unbiased.  This 
result  means  that  bank  loans  exerts  a  positive  influence  on  the  survival  of  new  firms 
independently on the screening of bank. We can explain this result by a minimum size effect. 
Bank financed firms can indeed reach the minimum efficient size more rapidly than the other 
firms. This situation makes them more resistant to shocks after two years of activity. An 
element in favor with this interpretation concerns the year 2001 that witnessed the bursting of 
the dotcom bubble. This crisis has weakened all businesses in particular the youngest ones, 
yet it is during that year (survival at three years) that the positive causal effect is the highest 
for the conditional probability of survival. 
Table 5: Results of the bivariate analysis - survival at n years and access to bank loans 
 
  Estimated model  Probit  Bivariate probit 
  Lifespan  Bank 
loans 










One year   0.241***  [0.191,0.292]  0.023  [-0.162; 0,207] 
Two years   0.206***  [0.169;0.242]  -0.248***  [-0.407,-0.089] 
Three years   0.279***  [0.247;0.312]  0.195*  [0,027;0.363] 
Four  years   0.293***  [0.262;0.324]  0,302***  [0,138; 0.465] 




Two  years /one  years  0.152***  [0.111;0.194]  -0.329***  [-0.516; -0,143] 
Three years /two years  0.274***  [0.233;0.316]  0,704***  [0,516; 0.892] 
Four years /Three years  0.203***  [0.156;0.251]  0,675***  [0,420; 0,930] 
Five years /Four years  0.094***  [0.042;0.146]  0,572***  [0,327; 0,818] 
†CI: Confidence Interval at 90% . Coefficient significant at 1%(***), 5%(**), 10%(*) 
To  confirm  the  results  given  by  the  bivariate  probit  model,  we  have  estimated  a 
Weibull  model  with  Gamma  heterogeneity.  In  the  Table  6,  we  only  present  the  results 
concerning the influence of banking debt on the likelihood of new firms to exit. The results 
concerning the other variables are given in the Appendix C. Four models are summed up in 
the Table 6. In the models 1 and 2, all explanatory variables are exogenous. These two models 
differ  by  the  introduction  in  the  model  2  of  time  varying  covariates.  In  this  model,  all 
financial variables are indeed crossed with time. The previous analysis showed that the effect 
over time was not linear but it is difficult to choose a specification of the time dependence that 
is not arbitrary. The choice of this dependence function implies that the initial effect is either 
insignificant (previous analysis has highlighted the absence of causal effect of banking debt in 
the first survival year) or negative (coefficient is greater than one and significant). In the 
models 3 and 4, the use of bank loan has been instrumented. The difference between these 14 
 
two models is equivalent to the difference between the models 1 and 2: in the model 4, all 
financial variables are crossed with time.  
Table 6: The impact of banking debt on the exit rate of new firms 
  Exogeneous bank loans  Endogeneous bank loans 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
Bank debt  0.482
 ***  0.956  0.786  3.200
*** 
Bank debt×age     0.974
***    0.947
*** 
Legend: coefficient significant at 10% (
+), 5% (*), 1% (**), 1 per thousand (***) 
When the analysis is static, i.e. it does not take into account covariates times (Models 
1  and  3),  results  are  relevant  with  those  given  by  Greffe  and  Simmonet  (2008).  Before 
instrumentation (Model 1), bank debt influences significantly and negatively the rate of exit 
of new firms. Once instrumented (Model 3), bank debt no longer influences survival. The 
authors  explain  this  result  because  bankers  only  offer  loans  to  the  best  new  firms.  Once 
corrected for this bias linked to a screening effect, bank financed new firms do not survive 
longer than the others. This first result should lead at first glance to reject the hypothesis of a 
pure impact of bank debt on the survival of new firms. However, once the analysis become 
more dynamic, this interpretation must be amended. As soon as time is introduced into the 
models explaining the exit rate of new firms, we observe a radical change concerning the 
effect of bank loans on lifespan. Results given by the instrumented model with covariates 
times (Model 4) stress a negative initial impact of bank debt on survival and a significant 
positive effect as soon as time is taken into account (the estimated coefficient of bank loans × 
age is inferior to one). Our results show that the effect of debt is not immediate but appears as 
soon as time is running. This effect appears to be persistently positive over time. Finally, our 
results suggest that the impact of bank loans should not be studied as an average effect but 
must take into account the horizon of time. The pure effect of banking debt is indeed not 
instantaneous but appears with time. This major result does not undermine the results given 
by other studies on short-term impact of banking debt but it stresses the existence of a more 
complex relation between the use of banking debt and the survival of new firms. 
4.2.Robustness check  
The robustness of these results is confirmed by using the Cox specification. This semi-
parametric  approach  specifies  the  baseline  hazard  very  flexibly.  The  most  important 
assumption of this model is the proportional hazard assumption. In this context, four models 
are estimated. The differences between these new models are the same than those described 
for the Weibull specification. In the dynamic model based on the Cox specification, we cross 
with time not only financial variables but all variables whose effects are time-dependent. The 
impact  of  bank  loans  on  new  firms‟  lifespan  is  qualitatively  the  same  with  the  Cox 
specification than with the Weibull one. This complementary analysis confirms the robustness 
of our result. 
To test the robustness of results, we also analyze the impact of dropping the non-
responses on the mode of financing. The bivariate probit shows a positive effect of the use of 
bank loans upon survival at n years (for all n from 1 to 5) and this effect is significantly 
increasing during the third year. The duration models always exhibit a positive effect of the 
use of bank loans on survival. This effect diminishes slowly over time. With all data, the 
initial effect is more important because non-respondents are often very small firms. Their start 
does not require external financing and they survive a very short time. 24.95% of these non-
respondents  indeed  need  less  than  1500 €  to  start  against  16.32%  of  respondents. 15 
 
Furthermore,  16.80%  of  non-respondents  survive  less  than  one  year  against  7.55%  of 
respondents.  
 
5.  Conclusion 
Financial  constraints  are  among  the  most  cited  impeding  factors  for  new  firms  to 
survive. However, finding the proof of credit rationing is a very difficult empirical task. In 
this article, we go beyond this issue and we directly question the effects of  banking loans on 
the  survival  of  French  new  firms.  More  precisely,  we  explore  the  issue  of  whether  the 
financial conditions into which a firm is born have an effect on its survival chances. We test 
empirical models that incorporate not only financial factors but all the variables linked with 
the entrepreneurs and their firm according to the results of prior research on entrepreneurship. 
We take into account the screening process used by bankers too. With this correction of the 
omitted  variables  bias,  we  deal  with  the  endogeneity  between  bank  loans  and  the  other 
variables and we prevent from the overestimation of the impact of bank loans on the survival 
of new firms.  
In this article we use the SINE database that gives information on new firms at birth, 
and successively three years and five years after their beginning. Although banking debt is, 
with trade credit, the sole external financial means available for small firms, we observe that 
less than 30% of French new firms set up in 1998 used bank finance at their birth. New firms 
used above  all internal  finance;  quite 80% of entrepreneurs  declared to self finance their 
project. However, banking debt is by far the most frequent way to externally finance new 
firms. This study shows, like Greffe and Simmonet (2008) how dealing with endogeneity 
modifies results concerning the effect of banking debt on survival. After instrumentation and 
within a static analysis, banking debt is no more significant in the survival function of new 
firms. This study underlines as well how taking into account time can modify results. By 
implementing both bivariate probit and duration models with time varying covariates, we find 
different results concerning the influence of banking finance on the survival in function of 
time (that corresponds to the age of firms). More precisely, we observe both an insignificant 
or negative impact of banking debt in the short term (less than 2 years) and a persistently 
positive effect in the medium term (more than 2 years). Founding financial conditions have 
long-lasting effects upon survival. We can explain the negative effect of banking debt at short 
term by the costs linked to indebtedness. This financial burden can sometimes push new firms 
to exit if they are not enough profitable. We finally empirically observe a kind of disciplining 
effect of banking debt for new firms. The positive influence of banking debt in the medium 
term can be explained by the pure effect of banking debt that allows new firms to start larger 
and to be more resistant to shocks thanks to banking commitments. We indeed observe a 
strong effect of banking debt at birth when new firms had to cope with the dotcom crisis in 
2001.  
Our study shows as well that the screening of banks on the population of new firms 
allows them to distinguish (however not perfectly) among “good” firms and “bad” ones.  The 
coefficient of banking debts in the survival function of new firms is indeed lower after the 
correction of the omitted-variables bias. Banks cannot perfectly identify the future successful 
new firms and those that will default but their screening must be taken into account both by 
academic studies and by policy makers. Our results show that bankers assess rather well the 
chances of new firm’s success despites the lack of track record. Our study supports the idea 
that banks can be used as a rather interesting channel to distribute public aids to new firms. 
Granting  banking  loans  to  new  firms  is  indeed  a  factor  of  longevity  for  them  and  the 16 
 
screening process of banks seems to be rather efficient as first it pushes the “worst” new firms 
to exit though a disciplining mechanism and the “best” to survive a longer time. Our results 
finally promote all state-financed measures that associate banks in their screening process. 
This is particularly the case in France for  loan guarantee schemes and for specific loans for 
new  firms  (  “Prêts  à  la  Création  d’Entreprise”)  which  are  distributed  at  least  partly  by 
commercial banks. 
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Appendix B. Probit estimation of the use of bank loans 
Variables       Variables    
Personal funds  -1.655*** 
Subsidies  0.139*** 
Private equities  -1.081*** 
Others loans  -0.784*** 
Demographic characteristics    
Gender (ref. man)  -0.035* 
Entrepreneur’s age  -0.005*** 
Nationality (ref. native)  0.340*** 
Education  (ref. no diploma)   
Technical undergraduate diploma  0.113*** 
Secondary school level  0.017 
Postgraduate diploma  -0.131*** 
Motivations    
Taste for entrepreneurship  0.241*** 
Catching an opportunity  0.111*** 
Expectations    
Growth  -0.048*** 
Cash flow problems  0.078*** 
Situation before creation (ref. employed)   
Short-term unemployment  0.036* 
Long-term unemployment  -0.194*** 
Non-workers  -0.240*** 
Experience in the main activity   0.061*** 
Previous activity experience   
Experience in production  0.146*** 
Experience in trade and marketing  -0.020 
Serial creator  -0.122*** 
Preparation of entry    
Financial prospective   0.475*** 
Market researches    -0.037** 
Professional advices  0.020 
Training program   0.137*** 
Entrepreneurial network   0.088*** 
Management (ref. manage alone)     
Management with family members   0.136*** 
Management with associates  -0.066** 
Sector activity (ref. Trade sector)   
Agribusiness  0.508*** 
Industry  0.120*** 
Building  0.135*** 
Transportation  0.196*** 
Real estate  -0.249*** 
Enterprise services  -0.138*** 
Private person services  0.244*** 
Education  0.357*** 
number of jobs (continue)   -0.014*** 
financial need (ref. less than 1500€)   
*1500€ , 3800€*  0.545*** 
*3800€ , 8000€*  0.912*** 
*8000€, 16000€*  1.215*** 
*16000€, 38000€*  1.964*** 
*38000€ , 76000€*  2.365*** 
>76000€  2.821*** 
Innovation   
Process  -0.251*** 
Product  0.028 
Marketing  0.090 
Subcontracting relationships   -0.119*** 
Franchising, concession, leading agent  -0.015 
Ownership of premises  0.150*** 
Localization (ref. near of residence)  -0.092*** 
Legal statute (ref. society)  0.436*** 
 
Legend: coefficient is significant at 1% (***), 5% (**), 10%(*) . 
 
Quality of regression : Pseudo R2 =0.36; correctly classified : 83.35% 21 
 
Appendix C. Survival analysis (Weibull specification with Gamma heterogeneity) 
Variables   Model 1   Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
Bank loans  0.482***  NS  NS  3.200*** 
Personal funds  0.794***  1.452***  NS  2.177*** 
Subsidies  NS  1.322**  NS  NS 
Private equities  NS  NS  NS  1.441* 
Others loans  0.711***  0.731***  0.805***  NS 
Bank loans × age     0.974***    0.947*** 
Personal funds × age    0.975***    0.969*** 
Subsidies × age    NS    NS 
Private equities × age    NS    NS 
Others loans × age    NS    NS 
Gender (ref. man)  0.820***  0.831***  0.825***  0.840*** 
Entrepreneur’s age  0.977***  0.979***  0.978***  0.980*** 
Nationality (ref. native)  0.612***  0.610***  0.600***  0.590*** 
Education  (ref. no diploma)         
Technical undergraduate diploma  NS  NS  NS  0.930* 
Secondary school level  0.815***  0.824***  0.819***  0.822*** 
Postgraduate diploma  0.859***  0.857***  0.871***  0.867*** 
Motivations          
Taste for entrepreneurship  0.742***  0.751***  0.724***  0.740*** 
Catching an opportunity  0.908***  0.911***  0.891***  0.897*** 
Expectations          
Growth  0.471***  0.500***  0.478***  0.532*** 
Cash flow problems  1.970***  1.879***  1.956***  1.822*** 
Situation before creation (ref. employed)         
Short-term unemployment  1.143***  1.110***  1.129***  1.085** 
Long-term unemployment  1.380***  1.325***  1.395***  1.336*** 
Non-workers  1.197***  1.177***  1.226***  1.215*** 
Experience in the main activity   0.674***  0.680***  0.674***  0.685*** 
Previous activity experience         
Experience in production  0.856***  0.862***  0.828***  0.842*** 
Experience in trade and marketing  1.287***  1.270***  1.272***  1.241*** 
Past experience(s) in setting up a firm  1.223***  1.215***  1.236***  1.218*** 
Preparation of entry          
Financial prospective   0.885***  0.899***  0.838***  0.845*** 
Market researches    1.271***  1.256***  1.273***  1.237*** 
Professional advices  0.916**  0.901***  0.898***  0.884*** 
Training program   NS  NS     
Entrepreneurial network   0.889***  0.901***  0.895***  0.905*** 
Management (ref. manage alone)           
Management with family members   0.854***  0.873***  0.844***  0.872** 
Management with associates  1.211***  1.201***  1.223***  1.206*** 
Agribusiness  NS  NS  NS  NS 
Industry  0.602***  0.640***  0.602***  0.659*** 
Building  0.415***  0.443***  0.419***  0.471*** 
Transportation  0.631***  0.676***  0.619***  0.697*** 
Real estate  0.731**  0.754***  0.770***  0.805*** 
Enterprise services  0.920*  0.917*  NS  NS 22 
 
Private person services  0.786***  0.782***  0.754***  0.750*** 
Education  0.253***  0.274***  0.250***  0.285*** 
Proxy 1 :  number of jobs (continue)   1.109***  1.106***  1.111***  1.103*** 
Proxy 2: financial need (ref. less than 1500€)         
*1500€ , 3800€*  NS  0.878**  0.899*  0.834*** 
*3800€ , 8000€*  0.719***  0.712***  0.677***  0.636*** 
*8000€, 16000€*  0.620***  0.605***  0.560***  0.522*** 
*16000€, 38000€*  0.469***  0.471***  0.384***  0.373*** 
*38000€ , 76000€*  0.395***  0.409***  0.305***  0.317*** 
>76000€  0.251***  0.273***  0.187***  0.217*** 
Innovation          
Process  1.483***  1.400***  1.514***  1.418*** 
Product  1.331***  1.313***  1.335***  1.299*** 
Marketing  1.132**  1.127**  1.119*  1.137** 
Subcontracting relationships (ref. no relation)  1.192***  1.186***  1.209***  1.190*** 
Franchising, concession, leading agent  1.255***  1.232***  1.255***  1.225*** 
Ownership of premises   0.682***  0.688***  0.674***  0.681*** 
Use of a computer   0.783***  0.801***  0.779***  0.819*** 
Localization (ref. far of residence)  1.121***  1.101***  1.134***  1.112*** 
Legal statute (ref. society)  2.019***  1.865***  1.894***  1.679*** 
 